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The article by Mervyn Bennun attempts to prove that the current government of South 
Africa is responsible for the violation of 
the Constitution, its international legal 
commitments and for defying a court 
order. But the faulty legal propositions 
underlying his argument must be 
analysed. 
The main arguments of the Author 
may be summarised as follows:
• Firstly, the African Union Convention 
and Diplomatic Immunities and 
Privileges Act that established the 
immunity of the Heads of State 
have not been enacted as a part of 
South African Law, and therefore 
are not binding in South Africa.
• Secondly, the Rome Statute and 
South Africa’s Implementation Act 
totally changed the pre-existing law 
governing the immunity of Heads of 
State.
Both arguments are defective. Let us 
analyse them in more detail.
The claim that the AU Convention 
has not been enacted to be a part of 
South African law and is therefore 
not binding in SA
Claiming that the AU Convention 
Diplomatic Immunities and Priviledges 
Act (DIPA) is valueless in defending 
the position of the government in the 
present case, Bennun states that this 
Act makes no reference to the ICC 
Statute. Why so? Bennun thinks that 
it is so because the only immunity 
DIPA conferred “is in relation to South 
African courts”.
To use such an argument to attack 
the position of the government is really 
strange, because this argument is 100% 
in favour of the government. The core 
of the present case is not the ICC, but 
the local state court. The government 
is under fire for not implementing the 
local court decision. And Bennun just 
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arresting a sitting Head of State. And it is noteworthy to stress – this duty 
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explained why it is fine – because 
foreign Heads of State have immunity 
in South African courts.
Do – according to DIPA – foreign 
Heads of State have immunity in 
relation to South African courts? The 
answer is a definite yes. This answer is 
yes in each and every case these local 
courts are intended to resolve. Simply 
this kind of court has no jurisdiction to 
try Heads of State. Later we will explain 
a bit more about how the matter of 
jurisdiction was just “forgotten”.
The Author (Bennun) does not 
understand the confusion of subject-
to-subject matter of the case. This 
case is not between the South African 
government and the ICC, but between 
the South African government and a 
South African court. Thus the norms 
on immunity of Heads of State before 
local courts are applicable, not the 
norms of the ICC Statute!
Analysing this argument of the 
Author further, it is interesting to 
notice an attempt to substitute the 
object of some international treaties 
on immunities and diplomatic 
law by playing with the definition 
of ‘diplomat’. The Author always 
stresses that the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations and DIPA 
grant immunities to ‘accredited’ 
diplomats, giving the impression that 
diplomatic missions are confined only 
to embassies with their staff. In another 
place the Author writes directly that 
“Al-Bashir was not in South Africa as an 
accredited diplomat in the Sudanese 
mission but as Head of State for the 
purposes of the AU Convention which, 
unlike the Rome Statute, has not been 
enacted to be a part of South African 
law. He thus enjoyed no immunity as a 
diplomat, and even as a Head of State 
any immunity he might otherwise have 
enjoyed had been nullified by Article 
27 of the Rome Statute…”.  
The claim that Omar Al-Bashir was 
not in South Africa as an accredited 
diplomat is quite an odd argument 
and may be a misrepresentation 
of international law. Diplomatic 
immunity covers other members of 
all kinds of diplomatic missions. The 
Vienna Convention of Diplomatic 
Relations enumerates these missions, 
which include temporary missions like 
governmental delegations etc.
The argument that the AU 
Convention and DIPA were not 
enacted as South African laws and 
thus are not binding is not sustainable. 
Yes, article 231.4 of the South 
African Constitution provides that any 
international agreement becomes law 
in the Republic when it is enacted into 
law by national legislation. But it does 
not mean that any non-domesticated 
international agreements are non-
binding! The second part of the same 
article states that a self-executing 
provision of an agreement that has 
been approved by Parliament (i.e. 
ratified) is law in the Republic. A 
non-domesticated international treaty 
may contain perfectly self-executed 
provisions and thus be binding to 
the state-party. The Author is just 
confusing two matters – the binding 
nature of the source of a law as a whole 
and nature of the norms contained in 
the source as well as the mode of the 
implementation of such norms. 
The weakness of this argument 
is also based on the lack of taking 
the law as a system. South African 
law consists not only of the ICC 
Statute Implementation Act. It also 
consists of other treaties and norms 
of customary international law. The 
Author demonstrates total disregard of 
customary international law, claiming 
that it was completely changed. This is 
quite strange, because the main point 
of the Author in claiming that the SA 
government violated the Constitution 
and it is exactly the SA Constitution 
that established the following regime 
of customary international law:
- the customary law is law in the 
Republic of South Africa,1 and  
- the interpretation of law must be 
conducted in a good faith. 
Taking all law (and not only selective 
part of it) into consideration is a clear 
part of such a good faith approach.
South Africa is not a signatory to 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT), which was concluded 
in 1969 and entered into force in 1980. 
But VCLT is regarded as declaratory of 
customary international law and binds 
all states regardless of whether they are 
a party to it or not. South Africa is not 
a party to the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, but, as explained 
by the Chief State Law Advisor (IL), 
is bound to the provisions of the 
Convention.2
Thus, interpreting the legal force 
of the AU Convention it is important 
to refer to the most fundamental 
rules of treaty status from the Vienna 
Convention of 1969. Article 18 of 
VCLT (“Obligation not to defeat the 
object and purpose of a treaty prior to 
its entry into force”) says that a State 
is obliged to refrain from acts which 
would defeat the object and purpose 
of a treaty even before the ratification 
(i.e. formal entry of the treaty into 
force) of the treaty.
It is clear that international treaty 
and customary law proclaim a special 
regime for the object and purpose of 
the treaties even those which are not 
ratified or entered into force. What is 
the purpose of AU Convention, DIPA 
and some other treaties, claimed to be 
non-domesticated? The purpose is to 
establish the regime for the diplomatic 
missions (not only for accredited 
diplomats as the Author claims) that 
assure the safe implementation of their 
tasks. The immunity of Heads of State 
is a necessary part of such a regime. 
So the claim that non-domestication 
of the DIPA or any other treaty makes 
them non-binding is wrong.
The Claim that the Rome Statute and 
South Africa’s ICC Implementation 
Act totally changed the pre-existing 
international law governing the 
The rules  
governing the 
jurisdiction of national 
courts must be 
carefully distinguished 
from those governing 
jurisdictional 
immunities: 
jurisdiction does 
not imply absence 
of immunity, while 
absence of immunity 
does not imply 
jurisdiction.
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immunity of heads of state
This claim is repeated so many 
times in so many different sources that 
it becomes a kind of an axiom that 
does not need to be proved. The only 
“proof” of this claim is an article 27 of 
the ICC Statute (repeated verbatim in 
Implementation Act). But let us read 
this text more attentively:
Article	 27	 Irrelevance	 of	 official	
capacity 
1. This Statute shall apply equally 
to all persons without any distinction 
based	on	official	capacity.	In	particular,	
official	 capacity	 as	 a	 Head	 of	 State	
or Government, a member of a 
Government or parliament, an elected 
representative	or	a	government	official	
shall in no case exempt a person 
from criminal responsibility under this 
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, 
constitute a ground for reduction of 
sentence. 
2. Immunities or special procedural 
rules	 which	may	 attach	 to	 the	 official	
capacity of a person, whether under 
national or international law, shall 
not bar the Court from exercising its 
jurisdiction over such a person.
The Author states that article 27 
“denies immunity to heads of state 
from the jurisdiction of the ICC”. But 
then he applies this conclusion to 
South African courts and not to ICC! 
The very first sentence of the para 
1 of the Article 27 shows that it is 
applicable to the ICC and individuals 
before the ICC. It clearly shows that 
it regulates the relations between 
individuals (be they heads of states 
or of governments) and the ICC only. 
There is nothing in this article that may 
impose any obligations to any other 
subject than these two. It must be said 
very clearly: this article may not be 
used as justification for the “abolition” 
of the immunity of the heads of states. 
At most it may be interpreted as a 
prohibition to the accused not to use a 
reference to his or her official capacity 
(as a special defence in criminal 
proceedings.
Article 31 of VCLT (General rule 
of interpretation) names as the first 
rule the rule of good faith: “A treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose”.
All attempts to ‘interpret’ a clear 
norm should be considered as made 
not in a good faith. Moreover when 
the norm is clear no interpretation is 
allowed. The correct establishment of 
the subject-to-subject matter shows 
that the article 27 of ICC Statute is really 
clear. It establishes relations between 
the accused and the ICC. To ‘extend’ 
this article to relations between ICC 
and states is simply a manipulation and 
violation of interpretation in good faith.
It is a pity that the Author spent 
so much space on a totally wrong 
proposition, but never proved his main 
argument. It is interesting to note that 
this mistake was made by the Author 
again by the wrong take in subject-
to-subject matter. We are fully aware 
that this negation of the customary 
international law immunity is not an 
exclusive argument of the Author. In 
fact he took it from the North Gauteng 
High Court (NGHC) Judgment issued 
on 24 June 2015. In para 28.8 of this 
Judgment the court says that the ICC 
Statute “expressly provides that heads 
of states do not enjoy immunity under 
its terms” and that “similar provisions 
are expressly included” in the IRSA. 
The court then drew an extraordinary 
conclusion: 
It means that the immunity that 
might otherwise have attached 
to president Bashir on customary 
international law as head of state, 
is excluded or waived in respect of 
crimes and obligations under the 
Rome Statute.
The conclusion totally lacks 
basis in any citation, explanation or 
interpretation. It simply states – “it 
means…” – and constructs a formula 
that suits the court. This ‘forgetfulness’ 
leaves the court’s decision with no 
legal force because it is not explaining 
how the ICC-to-accused norm was 
extended to ICC-to-states relations! It is 
absolutely clear that the North Gauteng 
High Court made a mistake claiming 
that ICC Statute and IRSA exclude 
or waive the immunity of heads of 
state and it changed the customary 
international law norm on immunity.  
We just analysed the two main 
arguments of the Author. Most of his 
article is based on these two defective 
arguments. We have already shown 
how often the Author confuses the 
subject-to-subject matters in analysing 
law. His uncritical reliance on the 
NGHC judgment is also wrong. If he 
had taken a critical approach to this 
Judgement he would have noticed at 
least one other confusion made by 
the court. And the court’s confusion 
is really amazing where it confuses 
jurisdiction and immunity! It assumed 
that the existence of jurisdiction (though 
established very unconvincingly) could 
just be equated with the absence of 
immunity! The International Court of 
Justice reminds us: ''the rules governing 
the jurisdiction of national courts must 
be carefully distinguished from those 
governing jurisdictional immunities: 
jurisdiction does not imply absence of 
immunity, while absence of immunity 
does not imply jurisdiction".3
Bennun is very selective in choosing 
which of the government’s arguments 
to battle with and which to ignore. He 
goes much further than the court and 
claims that government officials must 
be charged with treason. This selectivity 
does not sit well. In fact the article is 
based not on the analysis of the legal 
arguments of the government but on 
battling with words spoken by several 
government officials, made outside the 
court. The Author consistently avoids 
the legal arguments the government 
presented in court. 
He avoids even some arguments that 
with due and genuine consideration 
might disprove his idea of bringing 
the government to trial. For example, 
he ignores the impracticability of the 
NGHC decision.  Article 165 of the 
JUSTICE / BASHIR
It seems that is  
not the law that 
brings the Author to 
the idea of charging 
the government. It 
is idea of charging 
the government that 
brings him to his 
selection of the law 
and arguments to be 
cited or ignored. 
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Constitution states that “An order or 
decision issued by a court binds all 
persons to whom and organs of state 
to which it applies”. But this article 
is critically important in his analysis, 
because later he asks the questions: 
“Why should those who have sworn 
thus not be charged with treason? 
At the very least, why should those 
responsible, as Zulu has revealed, 
not be charged with contempt of 
court?” It is clear that if the Author 
honestly considered the argument of 
impracticability he could not have 
come up with these notions of treason 
or even contempt. So it seems that is 
not the law that brings the Author to 
the idea of charging the government. It 
is idea of charging the government that 
brings him to his selection of the law 
and arguments to be cited or ignored. 
By the way the argument of the 
impracticability of the NGHC decision 
is a very interesting one. It is most 
probable that this argument meant 
that president Al-Bashir was already 
out of the country when the court 
ruling was made. But there is another 
sense in this argument too. One does 
not require a very rich imagination to 
predict that the arrest of a head of state 
could lead to a declaration of war. The 
impracticability of a decision that might 
cause a war is a serious argument that 
could not be easily ignored. 
Let us, unlike Bennun, consider 
the government’s arguments; they are 
public. It was impracticable to execute 
the court’s decision, because the court 
ordered something that violated South 
African international legal obligations. 
Moreover, the court decision contains 
a lot of legal defects. Here some of 
them:
• The court acted contrary to 
established international law as was 
stated by the International Court of 
Justice in its Judgment in the Case 
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 
11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v Belgium): "it is firmly 
established that ... certain holders 
of high-ranking office in a State, 
such as the head of State ... , enjoy 
immunities from jurisdiction in other 
States, both civil and criminal". Thus 
NGHC clearly erred in law stating 
that President of Sudan "does not 
enjoy immunity in accordance with 
the rules of customary international 
law''.
• Article 32 of the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations (1961) 
provides that only the sending State 
may waive such immunity", and this 
"reflects customary international 
law". The domestic legislation giving 
effect to this Convention requires 
that any such waiver always be 
explicit and in writing. No such 
waiver exists in the given case. 
• There exists under customary 
international law no form of 
exception to the rule according 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction 
and inviolability to incumbent 
high state officials, where they are 
suspected of having committed 
war crimes or crimes against 
humanity. The NGHC again erred 
in construing an exception in the 
case of "international human rights 
law".
• The NGHC misconstrued Articles 
86 and 89 of the Rome Statute. 
Both provisions are internally 
qualified. Article 86 is subject to 
other provisions of the Statute, and 
article 89 is subject to Part 9 of the 
Statute. Thus both provisions are 
expressly subject to article 98(1) 
of the Statute. The effect of article 
98(1) is that a request by the ICC 
which would require South Africa to 
act inconsistently with the immunity 
of Sudan's President may not be 
made by the ICC unless the ICC can 
first obtain the cooperation of Sudan 
for the waiver of the immunity. 
Thus not only is it Sudan (not the 
Security Council) which must waive 
the immunity. The immunity is also 
expressly extant - otherwise there 
could be nothing to waive.4
To summarise, it is clear that the 
correct legal duty of South Africa was 
to desist from arresting a sitting Head 
of State. And it is noteworthy to stress – 
this duty lies in the competence of the 
executive, not the judiciary. Neither 
the ICC Statute nor the Implementation 
Act requires member States to violate 
the sovereign immunity of third party 
States' heads of state. But the North 
Gauteng High Court not only held 
that they do, but also imposed such 
legal duty on the Government. It did 
so by declaring in the first order that 
Government's failure to take steps 
to "arrest and/or detain" President 
of Sudan was inconsistent with the 
Constitution of South Africa".
The claim that the Government 
violated the Constitution
Aiming to prove that the South 
African government violated the 
Constitution, Bennun feels safe to 
make such a claim based on the court’s 
decision. The NGHC in its Judgment 
of 24 June 2015 indeed stated that the 
conduct of the governmental officials 
“is inconsistent with the Constitution”. 
This is another statement that was 
made with no convincing proof. 
In fact this statement was made the 
first time in the same court’s decision 
of 15 June and was left without any 
explanation at all. The count promised 
to issue the written reasoning ‘next 
week’. In fact it was issued later, but the 
Judgment of 24 June still contains no 
reasoning proving the violation of the 
Constitution. First of all, it was not said 
what exact article of the Constitution 
was violated by the government. 
Secondly, there was no legal reasoning 
leading to this conclusion. The only 
attempt to do this was reference 
(without citation) of the articles 1 and 
2 (where it is declared that the State 
is founded on the supremacy of the 
Constitution and the rule of law), 
reference (without citation) to article 
231 (where it says that international 
agreements bind the Republic) and 
full citation of the article 165 that 
enumerates the power of the judiciary. 
All this fills a little bit more than half of 
a page. Needless to say, this in no way 
proves that the government violated 
the Constitution. 
The  Author’s  critique  is that the 
government supposedly missed the 
point: “Their [government] response is 
significant: little effort has been made to 
criticise the High Court’s decisions in the 
terms in which they were made – that 
is, confined to the law which the Court 
was restricted to”. But whether the 
Author himself is correct in the object 
of his analysis? On one hand the Author 
refers to the High Court decisions, but 
in the very analysis he confined himself 
only to one decision. Is this accidental, 
or are there are more serious reasons for 
such a self-limitation?
JUSTICE / BASHIR
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Talking about the Al-Bashir case we 
are indeed facing several decisions of 
the NGHC, namely: Decision of 14 
June 2015 ordering the SA authorities 
to stop Al-Bashir from leaving the 
country, Decision of 15 June 2015 
claiming that the SA government 
violated the Constitution, and Decision 
of 25 June 2015 explaining why it 
had decided that the SA government 
violated the Constitution.5
Bennun refers only to the third 
decision, consistently avoiding the 
second one and acting as if there was 
no first one. This looks illogical. It is 
not logical to analyse the decision 
proclaiming the government as a 
violator of law without having a look 
at the very decision the accused is 
supposedly violating. But having a look 
at the first decision made this illogicality 
understandable.
Let us have a look at this first 
decision of 14 June 2015, signed “by 
the court” by “the Registrar” (without 
giving his or her name). It states that the 
respondents are compelled to prevent 
President Omar Al Bashir from leaving 
the country “until an order is made in 
this Court”. A draft order is attached to 
the same decision (an interim order is 
granted as follows):
1. President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan 
is prohibited from leaving the 
Republic of South Africa until a final 
order is made in this application, 
and the respondents are directed to 
take all necessary steps to prevent 
him from doing so.
2.  The eighth respondent, the Director 
General of Home Affairs is ordered:
 - to effect service of this order on 
the official in charge of each and 
every point of entry into, and exit 
from, the Republic, and
 - once he has done so, to provide 
the applicant with proof of such 
service, identifying the name of 
the person on whom the order was 
served at each point of entry and 
exit.6 
What is the most amazing part of 
this decision? In it is a lack of legal 
reasoning. The decision was made 
“having heard counsel for the parties 
and having read the documents filed 
of record.” No matter of jurisdiction 
was resolved. No legal authority was 
cited. No single reference to the law 
was made. 
Notwithstanding such ‘forgetfulness’ 
there are very serious questions of law 
that must be resolved before the court 
may be bold enough to prevent the 
head of a foreign state from returning 
to his home and, even more so, to 
oblige the government to prevent this 
head of state from leaving the country.
It is very clear that in issuing such an 
order the court needed to resolve these 
matters; and as we see, that was not 
done, good or bad. There was not even 
an attempt to resolve these matters. 
And it is clear why. Because there is 
no law that gives the court jurisdiction 
to judge a head of state. Then the 
question arises: is there an obligation 
on the government to implement an 
order that was made contrary to law 
and without legal reasoning?
The Al-Bashir case brought up a 
lot of interesting questions concerning 
national and international law. Some 
of them still have to be discussed and 
analysed. We do not think that these 
matters can be deeply analysed in the 
framework of a short article, so we only 
list them with a short commentary.
One of these is a question of 
foreign policy in the context of the 
separation of powers in South Africa. 
The implementation of the relations 
between South Africa and the ICC, 
including dealing with arrest warrants, 
is a prerogative of the executive. IRSA 
clearly names these governmental 
organs: Central Authority (meaning 
the Director-General, Justice and 
Constitutional Development) and 
National Director (meaning the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions). The 
role of the High Courts is limited to 
the implementation of the process 
that was started by the executive. For 
example, article 5.4 of IRSA states that 
the Cabinet member responsible for 
the administration of justice must … 
designate an appropriate High Court 
in which to conduct a prosecution 
against any person accused of having 
committed a crime. In all other 
instances the courts are mentioned 
only in relation of the process that was 
started by the government. There is 
nothing in the IRSA to claim that the 
South African courts may direct the 
government to implement ICC arrest 
warrants. Moreover there are quite 
clear indications that such a claim 
directly contradicts certain norms 
of IRSA. For example article 8.1 
(Endorsement of warrants of arrest) 
says that any request received from the 
Court for the arrest and surrender of a 
person for whom a warrant of arrest 
has been issued by the Court must be 
referred to the Central Authority and 
accompanied by such documents as 
may be necessary to satisfy a competent 
court in the Republic that there are 
sufficient	 grounds	 for	 the	 surrender	 of	
that person to the Court. There are at 
least two main conclusions that may be 
drawn from this text.
First – the execution of the arrest 
warrant is not a matter for the courts; 
it is a matter for the executive. Second 
– there is no automatic execution of 
arrest warrants. Before sending for 
the execution the Central Authority 
must verify that the received warrant 
is accompanied with very precise 
documents. Let us imagine that the 
Central Authority have not received the 
abovementioned documents. Or these 
documents were received but they do 
not satisfy a competent court that there 
are sufficient grounds for the surrender 
of the person. These conditions must 
be verified. 
There is no way to claim that 
execution of the arrest warrant is 
something automatic, as all protagonists 
of the ICC are claiming.  However, 
these protagonists claim it so repeatedly 
and so aggressively, that they indeed 
succeed in making us believe that South 
Africa must arrest at the first wish of the 
ICC! But the general and probably the 
main conclusion from the IRSA is that the 
relations between ICC and the Republic 
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otherwise there  
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of South Africa is a competence of the 
executive.7 According to the IRSA the 
judiciary has no power to interfere with 
ICC-government relations. We must 
expect serious consideration of the 
matter of interference in the executive 
competence. 
Another matter that definitely must 
be addressed is a problem victims v. 
people. The Author wonders: “how 
turning away from the ICC will be 
explained to the genocide victims in 
Sudan”. First of all it is quite strange 
why a lawyer claiming the sanctity 
of the rule of law throughout the 
whole text, totally disregards one of 
the fundamental element of this rule, 
namely the presumption of innocence? 
Why does he call Sudan’s President 
“genocidaire”? Now even non-lawyers 
know about presumption of innocence. 
There is no court’s decision proving 
the guilt of Al-Bashir in committing 
genocide. Second, the Author is 
concerned with what to say to victims 
of the crimes in Sudan, but seems to be 
totally not interested what will be the 
explanation to the population of the 
Republic of Sudan, who just elected 
Omar Al-Bashir as their Head of State.8 
The same non-interest is demonstrated 
in relation to the explanation to the 
people of  South Africa that may be 
plunged into war, if the government 
implemented the NGHC decision. 
The possible withdrawal of South 
Africa from the ICC 
We would like to finish the analysis 
of the Author’s article on his emotional 
rhetoric on the withdrawal of the 
Republic of South Africa from the ICC, 
when he calls the review of South 
African cooperation with the ICC as 
‘embarrassing’. Trying to placate the 
critics of the ICC, the Author says that 
‘commentators have justly pointed to 
anomalies and problems in the work of 
the ICC’ but that ‘this is not the paper to 
explore in depth the ugly inheritance of 
colonialism and the attempt by former 
colonial Powers to abuse the ICC for 
their own ends’. These definitions are 
misleading. The position that the ICC 
‘is not perfect’ is a sly one. 
The wily nature of the position that 
the ICC is just ‘not perfect’ is that all 
the problems with the ICC work are 
not anomalies, they are rules. What is 
really embarrassing is the manipulation 
with made-up urgency when the ICC 
decision that South Africa must arrest 
Al-Bashir was made by one judge 
instead of the full bench. What is really 
embarrassing is that the ICC judge 
refused to meet with the Chief Legal 
Advisor of South Africa who had gone to 
the Court. What is really embarrassing 
is that the ICC is delivering decisions 
with no legal reasoning or when these 
decisions are reasoned but contrary to 
international law.9
The review of relations with the ICC 
is a legitimate and reasoned decision. 
The time for illusion is over for many 
states. It is now clear: more and more 
states are starting to realise that the ICC 
is not an international institution. That 
means the International Criminal Court 
is not acting in the name and in the 
interest of the member-states. It acts in 
the name and in the interest of global 
powers with their own agenda. Thus all 
primitive arguments like “we shall stay 
in the ICC and influence it from inside” 
are just naïve. 
It is difficult not to see the process 
of radical changes that modern 
international law is experiencing. 
First of all – there are continuous and 
aggressive attempts to destroy the 
very substance of international law 
as law of common benefit, created 
by all members of the international 
community by their free will. 
One of the most important 
appendices to the current negotiations 
on the treaty called ‘Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership’ – Trade in 
Services Agreement – is an attempt to 
create a new trade regulation system 
outside the WTO. This is a clear attempt 
to create the club of privileged states 
acting to the detriment of the majority 
of states. The BRICS states were not 
invited or even informed about the 
very fact of these negotiations. The 
agreement was prepared in secrecy 
until last year. Even in 2015 we were 
merely informed about the fact that this 
treaty is in preparation, but the content 
is confidential. If it will be signed it will 
remain confidential for five years. On 
the European side the negotiations 
were conducted by the European 
Commission in its own name, without 
consultations with EU member-states. 
The destruction of Ukraine as a 
state was as a result of an open threat 
to the country to sign the treaty of 
‘association’ with European Union. 
The Government of President V. 
Yanukovych who postponed (only 
postponed, not refused!) the signing, 
was overthrown. 
The destruction of international 
law is not going on as a side effect. 
It is being implemented as a policy, 
thus there were special institutions 
established. The International Criminal 
Court is one of these institutions. One 
of the aims of the ICC is to destroy 
current progressive international law 
and to create new – regressive and then 
repressive – international law. One of 
the features of the laws being created 
is the abolition of the fundamental 
norms of international order, including 
the immunity of heads of state. The 
Al-Bashir case is not a case about a man 
called Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir. 
Immunity is not a personal thing, it is 
an integral part of the sovereignty of 
independent states. 
So South Africa was being forced 
to take part in a violent attack on the 
sovereignty of a foreign state, putting 
the peoples at risk of war. In this 
context the Author’s question – “Why 
is this not a quiet coup d'état?” – might 
be very useful for deeper reflection. 
Though it might lead us in a different 
direction from that which Bennun 
seeks. ■
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